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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MILTON C. BRANDON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.- No. 8473 
HOvV ARD C. TEAGUE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties will be designated as they appeared in 
the trial court. Defendant does not agree with the state-
ment of f.acts in plaintiff's brief because it is incom-
plete and, in part, inaccurate. Therefore, the following 
statement is submitted: 
Although the case has already been before the 
Supreme Court of lJtah on defendant's original proceed-
ing in the nature of prohibition (see Supreme Court Case 
No. 8232, entitled "Howard C. Teague, Plaintiff vs. the 
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2 
District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and Milton C. Brandon, 
Defendants"), it is believed that it will be helpful if the 
facts are stated in chronological order from the incep-
tion of this matter to the present time. 
References to the record will be limited to avoid 
confusion which might result from the fact that the pre-
sent record is numbered in red from pages 1 through 
10, but page 10 is actually the record which was before 
this Court in Case No. 8232, a~d it likewise is numbered 
in red, from page 1 forward. 
' 
On October 1, 1953, plaintiff filed an action against 
the defendant in the District Court of Salt Lake County 
to recover damages for personal injuries suffered in an 
accident which occurred when plaintiff was a guest in 
a car driven by defendant. The case was assigned No. 
99973. Service of sumn1ons was attempted under the 
provisions of the Non-Resident 1\fotorist Act (U.C.A., 
1953, 41-12-8). 
On M.arch 25, 1954, defendant filed his motion to 
quash the purported service of sunm1ons upon the ground 
that the defendant was not a nonresident of Utah at the 
time the cause of action arose. 
The hearing on defendant's 1notion to quash was held 
1n the District Court of Salt Lake County before the 
Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., Judge, on April 20, 1954. 
In support of his n1otion, defendant submitted an af-
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fidavit signed by one of his counsel which alleged in sub-
stance and effect that for many months prior to the date 
of the accident out of which this case arose, the defendant 
was residing as a soldier at Deseret Chemical Depot, 
Tooele County, Utah, and he could be located there for 
personal service for 1nany months before the accident 
and many months following the accident. Upon hearing, 
plaintiff introduced as an exhibit a copy of the investiga-
tive report of the Utah I-Iighway Patrol, which contained 
information indicating that the defendant's automobile 
carried North Carolina license plates at the time of the 
accident. Plaintiff's counsel also testified and defendant's 
counsel was cross-examined. 
The District Court denied defendant's motion to 
quash and the defendant petitioned the Supreme Court 
of Utah for an Interlocutory Appeal, which petition was 
denied June 1, 1954. 
On J ~ly 1, 1954, defendant filed a complaint in the 
Supreme Court of Utah in an original proceeding, which 
was assigned Case No. 8232. In substance, defendant's 
complaint :alleged that the defendant was not a nonresi-
dent of Utah at the time of the accident, and the Supreme 
Court was urged, to prohibit· the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, and Brandon, from proceeding further in 
Case No. 99973. The District Court of Salt Lake County 
did not plead to the complaint, but Brandon, plaintiff 
herein, filed a motion to dismiss. Upon the issues joined 
by these pleadings, the matter was argued and submitted 
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to the Supreme Court after preparation and filing of 
briefs by plaintiff and defendant. 
By decision of the Supre1ne Court filed August 5, 
1955, the Court, speaking through its Chief Justice, held: 
"We have not been cited to a case holding 
that such scant evidence as we have here before 
us was sufficient to support a finding of non-
residence, and since the element of jurisdiction 
is necessary to Brandon's case, the failure of proof 
must lie with him. The trial court erred in denying 
the motion to quash ; hence, the alternative writ 
heretofore issued will be made permanent." 
The remittitur from the Supreme Court was filed 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County on August 26, 
1955. Five days later plaintiff filed an amended com-
plaint in the same case, Case No. 99973, but the only 
amendment consisted of the allegation that tlJ_e defend-
ant "is, and at .all times herein mentioned was," a non-
resident of the State of Utah. In the original complaint, 
plaintiff had alleged n1erely that defendant "is a non-
resident." 
At the time the decision of the Supreme Court was 
rendered, no formal writ was issued by that Court, pro-
hibiting further action in Case No. 99973. Ho,vever, when 
plaintiff filed his a1nended complaint, the fact of such 
filing was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court, 
which thereafter issued its \Yrit under date of September 
20, 1955, commanding the District Court of Salt Lake 
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County '"to refrain and desist perrnanently from any 
further proceedings in the matter ... " 
Upon further consideration, the Supreme Court is-
sued its supplemental writ under date of September 30, 
1955, in which the Court's order was : 
"Vl e command and require the said District 
Court of the County of S.alt Lake to refrain and 
desist permanently from any further proceedings 
in the matter entitled 'Milton C. Brandon, Plain-
tiff vs. Howard C. Teague, Defendant,' Civil No. 
99973, until such time as jurisdiction of the defen-
dant is acquired." (Italics added to show new 
matter in supplemental writ.) 
After the issuance of the first writ by the Supreme 
Court, but before the issuance of the supplemental writ, 
the plaintiff, on September 23, 1955, filed a new com-
plaint on the same cause of action. This was given Civil 
No. 106335, and the identical language was used as had 
been used in the amended complaint which had been filed 
August 31, 1955. Service of summons was again at-
tempted in the same language as had been previously 
used, and again plaintiff urged the applicability of the 
Non-Resident Motorist Act previously cited. 
On October 1--l-, 1955, defendant, by special appear-
ance, in C.ase No. 106335, filed his motion to quash ser-
vice of summons upon the ground of insufficiency of 
service, and to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff 
upon the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over 
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the p·erson of the defendant. The Inotions were grounded 
upon the contents of the files and records of the trial 
court in the first case, No. 99973, and upon the decision 
of the Supreme Court in that case. 
Hearing on defendant's motions was had before 
District Judge Martin ~1. Larson on November 1, 1955. 
The trial court heard arguments of counsel and defend-
ant submitted to the Court for its consideration the files 
and records in· Case No. 99973. Although the jurisdiction 
of the Court was being challenged by the defendant in 
exactly the same fashion as it had been challenged in the 
tirst case, plaintiff offered no proof of any kind and the 
motion was submitted for decision on the former record. 
On November 14, the District Court orally .advised 
counsel that "the n1otions are granted and the action 
dismissed." This order assumed formal stature on No-
vember 18, 1955, when the Court signed and entered a 
formal judgment of dismissal in "\Vhich it was ordered 
and adjudged that the service of summons be quashed 
and the motion to dismiss b~ gr.anted and the action 
was ordered dismissed. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
'THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS A NON-
RESIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE 
WAS SQUARELY PRESENTED AND DETERMINED IN 
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THE FORMER CASE, AND IS, THEREFORE, RES JUDICATA 
AS BE'TWEEN THESE PARTIES. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS NOT 
APPLIED HERE, PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SUST'AIN 
THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THE NO·NRESIDENCE OF 
DEFEN·DANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDAN·T WAS A NON-
RESIDENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF T'HE STATUTE 
WAS SQUARELY PRESEN·TED AND DETERMINED IN THE 
FORMER ·CASE, AND IS, THEREFORE, RES JUDICATA AS 
BETWEEN THESE PARTIES. 
In the first action, which was Case No. 99973, plain-
tiff alleged defendant was a nonresident and that he 
was entitled to sue defendant under the terms of the 
Utah Non-Resident 11otorist Act. Defendant, by his 
motion to quash, ch.ailenged that allegation and, by the 
affidavit filed in support of the motion, stated facts in 
contradiction of plaintiff's claim. 
Thus, the issue was joined upon the first hearing 
before Judge Van Cott. The nature of this issue cannot 
longer be in doubt, for this Court, in its de·cision in Case 
No. 8232, stated as follows: 
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"An issue of fact, i.e. whether or not Teague 
was a resident at the time of the accident, was 
joined at the hearing on the question of jurisdic-
t . " lOll ••• 
The Court then went on to say that when a plain-
tiff attempts to use this method of substituted service, 
he must, "upon challenge," prove a prima facia case that 
defendant was a nonresident. 
The Court then examined the evidence which had 
been presented and concluded that there was not suf-
ficient evidence presented to show that Teague was a 
nonresident. Determination of that issue by the Supreme 
Court was indispensable to its decision sinee, if the de-
fendant were a nonresident at the time of the accident, 
defendant's motion to quash ought to have been denied, 
but if defendant were not a nonresident at that time, the 
motion ought to have been granted. 
Defendant contends that the language of this Court 
in McCarthy v. State (Utah, 1953), 265 P. 2d 387, leads 
irresistibly to the conclusion that the judgment of the 
trial court ought to be affirmed. 
In that case the Court said : 
" . . . A judgment of dismi~sal for want of 
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the matters upon 
which the ruling was 'YI;ecessarily based." 
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As Mr. Justice Crockett commented: 
"No reason is apparent why the rule should 
be less applicable to a decision denying jurisdic-
tion than to one sustaining it." 
In the McC.arthy case the Court was discussing what 
had transpired in the United States District Court for 
Utah when that Court had entered a judgment of- dis-
Inissal upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction of the 
action. In concluding that the action of the Federal 
Court was conclusive upon the question before this Court, 
it was said: 
"The issue having been squarely presented 
and determined, it is res judicata as between these 
parties.'' 
These principles are clearly applicable to the present 
case. The very same issue which was squarely presented 
to and determined by this Court in Case No. 8232 was 
again before the District Court in the present case. Plain-
tiff alleged defendant's nonresidence, and defendant 
moved to quash .and to dismiss upon the grounds which 
he had previously urged in the first case. Plaintiff of-
fered no evidence to the contrary. Since the issue was 
determined adversely to the plaintiff in the former case 
by the judgment of this Court and since such judgment 
is now final, the principle of res judicata ought to apply. 
Plaintiff has advanced only one reason why the doc-
trine of res judic.a ta should not be applied here. In 
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summary, plaintiff contends that he did not have the 
opportunity to present proof on the question of Teague's 
nonresidence on the first hearing because both parties 
proceeded under the "erroneous concept of law" that the 
burden of proof was on defendant and not plaintiff. 
Plaintiff states (Brief, page 4) that the decision by the 
Supreme Court in Case No. 8232 "was a reversal of the 
procedure which was followed in the trial ... " 
Further, it is contended by plaintiff (Brief, page 5) 
that: 
" . . . The trial court in the original hearing 
as well as both parties assumed that on the ques-
tion of the residency of Teague defendant had 
the burden of coming forward and presenting 
evidence to sustain his affirmative allegation that 
Teague was a resident." 
These contentions by plaintiff are not supported by 
the record. In fact, the record is directly contrary. The 
attention of the Court is called to the transcript of the 
hearing on the first case, which is found at page 24 of 
the record considered in Case No. 8232, and which re-
flects the position of the defendant on the hearing be-
fore Judge Van Cott on April 20, 1954. At that time 
counsel for the defendant stated that he was urging the 
court to grant the motion of the defendant, "because I 
don't think he (plaintiff) has sustained the burden of 
sustaining jurisdiction which I have placed in issue by my 
motion .. " After further colloquy between the court and 
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counsel for plaintiff, the trial court commented (first 
Record, 24) : 
"I think you ought to make some showing, Mr. 
1\::ing, to controvert his .affidavit here." 
If there h.as been any misunderstanding of the effect 
of the decision of the Supreme Court, or if there has been 
any reliance by anyone upon the proposition that the 
burden was on the defendant to show that he was not a 
nonresident, such misunderstanding and reliance is 
shared only by plaintiff. 
Defendant has always asserted, and now asserts, 
that the burden was upon the plaintiff to establish the 
jurisdictional facts in his case from the time the defend-
ant filed .a motion to quash service of summons. The 
Supreme Court, in its decision in Case No. 8232, stated 
that it held the same view, when it said: 
"We hold that the plaintiff attempting to 
use this method of substituted service must, upon 
challenge, prove a prima facia case that the de-
fendant is a nonresident." 
The Supreme Court then went on to examine the 
record, which, so far as the evidence is concerned, is the 
same record as is now before the Court. The Court con-
cluded that plaintiff had not sustained the burden of 
proof and that defendant's motion ought to have been 
granted. It is difficult to understand how plaintiff can 
now .assert that the Supreme Court, on the basis of the 
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same evidence, ought to arrive at a contrary decision, 
even if it entirely disregarded the doctrine of res jud-
icata. 
Plaintiff has had his day in court . on the question 
of proving the necessary jurisdictional elements. No 
sound reason is set forth in his brief why he ought to be 
given another day in court. If he is allowed another, and 
if, upon that occasion, he likewise failed in his burden, 
what is to prevent him, under his theory, from asking a 
further chance to try again ~ 
The very purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is 
to put at rest the contentions of p~arties when an issue 
has been litigated. As the Supreme Court of the United 
States stated, through Mr. Justice Roberts: 
"Public policy dictates that there be an end of 
litigation; that those who have contested an issue 
shall be bound by the result of the contest, and 
that matters once tried shall be considered for-
ever settled as between the parties ... " Baldwin 
v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association, 283 
U.S. 522, 51 S. Ct. 517, 75 L. ed. 1244. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS NOT 
APPLIED HERE, PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN 
THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THE NONRESIDENCE OF 
DEFENDAN·T. 
Even if the doctrine of res judicata were not ap-
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plicable in this case, there is still a further hurdle which 
plaintiff has not crossed in his attempt to obtain jurisdic-
tion in the present action. 
He .alleged that defendant was a nonresident. De-
fendant, by his motion based upon the record in the 
former case, again attacked that allegation, in addition 
to raising the claim of res judicata. Again, therefore, 
plaintiff was put upon the burden of proof. But, when 
the matter came on for hearing before Judge Larson, 
plaintiff presented no evidence of any kind in support of 
that burden. Thus, it is clear that he failed again to 
sustain the burden of proof put upon him. 
It will not suffice for plaintiff to imply, as inferred 
from his brief, that he was not aware that he had a 
duty to go forw.ard with the proof. Even if he were not 
so aware of his duty in the first hearing, there can be 
no doubt that he is conclusively presumed to know that 
he had that burden in the light of the decision of this 
Court in its Case No. 8232. Nevertheless, although the 
decision had been in existence for nearly three months at 
the tilne of the he.aring in the present case, plaintiff was 
silent when offered the opportunity to present evidence 
on the question of Teague's residence. The trial court, 
it \vill be recalled, did not enter judgment preemptorily, 
but took the matter under advisement. Both parties were 
allowed every opportunity to present any evidence or 
theory, and yet plaintiff remained silent. 
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Even in the absence of the doctrine of res judicata, 
therefore, the case novv is in the same posture as when 
it was first considered by this Court in Case No. 82'32. 
The issue was joined, plaintiff had the burden of proof, 
and failed to sustain it. No re.ason is suggested why 
this Court, on this record, should reach a conclusion dif-
ferent from its decision of August 5, 1955. 
What plaintiff actually seeks here is not a second 
chance, but rather a third chance to prove the same issue. 
He had his first chance on April 20, 1954. He did not ef-
fectively utilize that opportunity. He had his second 
chance on November 1, 1955, before District Judge Lar-
son, and again failed to present any evidence of any 
kind bearing upon the question of residence. He now asks 
this Court for the right to have a further opportunity to 
litigate the same issue. It is respectfully submitted that 
he has no such right. 
CONCLUSION 
The following quotation expresses defendant's posi-
tion on this entire matter: 
" ... Public policy and the interest of litigants 
.alike require that there be an end to litigation, 
which, without the doctrine of res judicata, would 
be endless. The doctrine ... rests upon the ground 
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that the party to be affected ... has litigated ... 
the same matter in a former action in a court 
of competent jurisdiction, and should not be per-
mitted to litigate it .again to the harassment and 
vexation of his opponent ... " 30 Am. J ur. 910-12 
(Judgments, Sec. 165). 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the 
trial court was correct and should be affirmed by this 
Court, and that the litigation on this jurisdictional ques-
tion be thereby terminated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW 
& CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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